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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
The e¤ects of the public pension system on economic performance is an issue that attracts
ongoing interest from policy makers and scholars. Beyond issues of scal sustainability,
one of the key concerns is whether labor market outcomes are adversely a¤ected by the
existing design of Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems. A large literature has studied these
issues, see Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck and Persson (2003)
and Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a few important reviews. Part of the recent policy
debate, particularly in the U.S., has focussed on the choice between increased capital
funding (e.g. Kotliko¤ (1997), Feldstein (2005a,b), and Feldstein and Samwick (2002))
versus parametric reform of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems (e.g. Diamond (2004),
Diamond and Orszag (2005)). Apart from its impact on national savings, the potential
labor market implications of public pensions have played an important role in this debate.
The crucial question is the extent to which the contributions to an earnings linked pen-
sion system are actually perceived as a tax. The e¤ective tax rate can amount to roughly
half of the statutory contribution rate, as recent calculations for Germany by Fenge and
Werding (2004) have shown. Beginning with Feldstein and Samwick (1992), the literature
has calculated a much higher tax component for young workers far from retirement, while
the e¤ective tax is, in contrast, much lower for workers nearing retirement. Disney (2004)
provided recent computations of the e¤ective tax rates implied by PAYG contributions
and econometric estimates of the employment e¤ects. The results are consistent with
usual ndings of the empirical literature on intensive labor supply, namely that male em-
ployment is not particularly responsive to tax incentives, while female activity rates are
highly adversely a¤ected by the e¤ective contribution tax.
According to the inuential studies of Gruber andWise (1999, 2004), a serious problem
associated with PAYG systems is that they impose signicant disincentives for labor
market participation of older workers.1 Gruber and Wise (2005) provide calculations
for the relationship between later retirement and the additional benets that lead to
1Gruber and Wise (1999) calculate the implicit tax rates of working another year for a number of
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actuarial fairness.2 Börsch-Supan (2000, 2003) provides evidence on the participation
decisions of older German workers. Scarpetta (1996) nds empirical evidence supporting
this phenomenon in a cross-country study. A major factor behind the trend toward
early retirement is that existing PAYG systems distort the labor supply decision on the
extensive margin and thereby encourage early retirement. Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999)
suggest that early retirement provisions in many countries have led to a dramatic decrease
in the labor force participation among older workers. The fact that benets are not
adjusted in an actuarially fair manner is a key reason for this large distortion. Theoretical
work on social security and retirement decisions is inspired by the seminal contributions
of Feldstein (1974), Sheshinski (1978) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). More recent
theoretical work on the (optimal) design of pension systems in the presence of a retirement
decision is found, for example, in Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and Cremer et al. (2004).3
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of the pension system on aggregate
unemployment (see Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000), Corneo and Marquardt (2000), and
countries. For Germany the implicit tax of working between ages 60-61 is roughly 35%, while in France it
is close to 70%. They nd a much lower, approximately 0%, implicit tax in the U.S., which is due to the
fact that not only is the replacement rate much lower in U.S., but also because of actuarial adjustment
between ages 62 and 65 and smaller payroll tax rates. In their later paper using microestimation Gruber
and Wise (2004) consider, among other issues, a reform package that incorporates early retirement at
60, normal retirement at 65, a 60% replacement rate, and actuarial adjustment. They show that this
simulated reform has mixed e¤ects across countries depending on the specic benchmark provisions of
national programs. For the U.S. this reform increases the incentives to retire early due both to the
lower eligibility age and the higher replacement rate, while for other countries, such as Italy, France, and
Germany, these measures represent a substantial increase in the incentives to stay in the workforce.
2In the case of Germany Gruber and Wise (2005) estimate that an actuarially fair reduction in benets
increases the retirement age by about 3 years. Moreover, they calculate a signicant scal e¤ect on the
order of 1.2% of GDP.
3See Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a review. Breyer and Hupfeld (2010) point out the distributional
e¤ects of pension reform towards more actuarial fairness. Cremer et. al. (2004) focus on redistribution
towards the ill. The redistributional implications of retirement incentives are, nevertheless, not the focus
of this paper.
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Cigno (2008) and the empirical analysis of Adam (2007)).4 It is fair to say, we believe, that
neither the theoretical nor empirical literature on pensions and unemployment focusses to
a great extent on the di¤erential impact of young versus old workers and the interaction
with respect to the retirement decision.5
The novel contribution of this paper is an analysis of how a PAYG pension system
a¤ects life-cycle unemployment among young and old workers and how this interacts with
labor market participation of older workers. Building on Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010),
which abstracts from unemployment, we set up a model with endogenous retirement and
life-cycle unemployment resulting from job search subject to labor market frictions that
is combined with a general formulation of a PAYG pension system. We believe that the
novel focus on life-cycle unemployment and retirement is important in the face of high
unemployment rates in OECD countries and the large share of social security contributions
in the overall labor tax burden.
More specically, the analysis should be interesting for at least three reasons: (i) it
sheds some light on the popular claim that increased labor market participation of older
workers might adversely a¤ect unemployment among younger workers. The argument is
that raising the retirement age boosts the number of older workers who might crowd out
younger employees and thereby add to prime age unemployment. Jousten et al. (2010)
do not nd empirical support for this mechanism. Our theoretical results show that rais-
ing the retirement age is likely to improve the scal stance, leading to a lower labor tax
burden, more job search and, in turn, lower prime age unemployment; (ii) Our analysis
highlights some features of real world PAYG systems that have been rather neglected in
both theoretical and empirical work. Some countries allow periods of unemployment to
4In Cigno (2008) a Beveridge-type system in which contributions are unrelated to benets discourages
overall labor supply, while a Bismarckian system has ambiguous e¤ects depending on whether the system
is actuarially fair and whether agents are credit constrained.
5An exception is the recent empirical work of Gruber et al. (2010), who nd, among other results,
that the implicit retirement tax faced by older workers is slightly positively related to the unemployment
rate of the young.
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create pension entitlements by adding a fraction of the last earnings prior to unemploy-
ment to the pension assessment base, presumably to prevent old age poverty. We nd
that this feature undermines search incentives and boosts unemployment; (iii) These re-
sults also connect to the literature on unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA)
as a novel policy tool to ght unemployment (see Stiglitz and Yun (2005), Brown et
al., (2008), Feldstein and Altman (2007), and Bovenberg, Hansen and Sorensen (2008),
among others). UISAs lead to a reduction in pension income whenever an individual is
unemployed and withdraws benets from her account. The econometric results in Reyes
et al. (2010) provide strong support to the idea that UISAs can improve work incentives
and reduce unemployment. Including the replacement income of unemployment insur-
ance in the pension assessment base is exactly the opposite to UISAs and is likely to
boost unemployment. The quantitative results in Keuschnigg et al. (2010) indeed show
a substantial impact on the unemployment rate.
The present paper sets up a model of endogenous retirement and life-cycle unemploy-
ment in a frictional labor market. We rst derive e¤ective tax rates on all three margins
of life-cycle labor supply, which is in itself a novel contribution to the literature, and show
how they depend on retirement incentives and other features of an earnings linked PAYG
pension system. We then study the real e¤ects and the welfare consequences of several
policy scenarios that avoid intergenerational redistribution and isolate the e¢ ciency gains
and losses of pension reform (see Keuschnigg (1994) on the concept of intergenerational
neutrality). More specically, we investigate four scenarios that play a prominent role in
many countries: (i) increasing actuarial fairness of the pension system towards retirement
behavior; (ii) strengthening the tax benet link by a harmonization of the system; (iii)
reforming the pension assessment base by excluding periods of unemployment; and (iv)
extending the calculation period.
The importance of scenario (i) is evident from the ndings of the overall Gruber-
Wise research program on pensions and retirement behavior. We nd that more actuarial
fairness by making pensions conditional on retirement choice not only encourages post-
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poned retirement but also stimulates employment among young workers. Our model thus
excludes crowding out of younger workers by older ones, a result that is line with the em-
pirical ndings of Jousten et al. (2010). However, there is an ambiguous e¤ect on search
incentives and employment of older workers. Despite of this ambiguity, the net welfare
gain is clearly positive. Relating to (ii), the empirical results in Adam (2007) conrm that
in countries with a strong tax benet link, a higher pension income, holding statutory tax
rates constant, reduces unemployment. This e¤ect is explained in our model because the
experiment implies a lower e¤ective tax rate and thereby stimulates search. However, the
relation breaks down in countries with a Beveridge-type system with at pensions unre-
lated to previous earnings. We model the strengthening of the tax benet link (also called
harmonization of the system) by shifting the composition of total retirement benets from
at to earnings linked pensions. In particular, we nd that harmonization boosts work in-
centives on all three margins of life-cycle labor supply, reduces unemployment (consistent
with the empirical results of Adam (2007)), and unambiguously raises welfare. Regarding
(iii), a reform that eliminates periods of unemployment from the pension assessment base
strengthens search incentives, boosts employment over the entire life-cycle, encourages
late retirement, and promises unambiguous e¢ ciency gains. The empirical importance of
our results is clearly backed up by the evidence in Reyes et al. (2010). Finally, extending
the calculation period for pension assessment as in scenario (iv) favors young workers
and encourages postponed retirement while employment rates of older workers close to
retirement respond ambiguously. Welfare rises if job search among old workers is inelastic
or if it is not distorted in the rst place.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives the
comparative statics behavior. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of four specic re-
form scenarios, and Section 5 concludes. Some technical computations are moved to an
appendix.
5
2 The Model
To explore the implications of pension reform on life-cycle unemployment and old age
participation, we use a highly stylized 2-period model with three overlapping generations.
In period one, an initial oldgeneration 0, living in its second period of life and consuming
Co, coexists with a young generation 1 living in its rst period, consuming C1. When
generation 1 grows old in period 2, it consumes C2 and coexists with a nal future
generation which, in turn, lives in its rst period of life, consumes Cf and dies thereafter.
Normalizing the size of each cohort to one, aggregate consumption is Co +C1 in the rst
period and C2+Cf in the second period. The world ends at the end of period 2. We focus
on labor supply of generation 1 in both life-cycle periods and exclude any labor market
decisions of other generations, i.e. we assume that the initial old generation 0 is fully
retired and labor supply of the future generation 2 is exogenous. The production side is
deliberately kept simple. Assuming a Ricardian technology, labor earns a xed wage w,
equal to the output of an employed worker. A unit of savings and investment generates
output R > 1 next period. The labor market is subject to search frictions such that a
given e¤ort in job search results in employment only with a probability less than one, and
ends in unemployment otherwise. All agents are risk-neutral.
2.1 Households
Life-cycle labor market behavior of generation 1 consists of job search in both periods and
a retirement decision in the second period of life. To focus on labor supply, we abstract
from savings and intertemporal consumption choice and assume that present and future
consumption are perfect substitutes. With the interest factor R equal to the rate of time
preference, households are concerned with the present value, but not with the timing of
consumption. They spend e¤ort ls on job search in periods s = 1; 2 and choose a retire-
ment datex in the second period equal to the fraction of time x of actively remaining in
the workforce, where 1 x represents the time in retirement. Job search and continued la-
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bor market participation lead, respectively, to increasing and convex e¤ort costs  (ls) and
 (x), so that  0 > 0,  00 > 0, 0 > 0 and 00 > 0. As a further simplication, we assume
preferences to be linearly separable between consumption and e¤ort, thereby eliminating
income and wealth e¤ects on labor supply.6 Thus, the specication of preferences is
V = C1    (l1) + [C2   x (l2)   (x)] =R: (1)
Given a frictional labor market, households supply a variable search e¤ort 0 < ls < 1
and incur an e¤ort cost  (ls) to obtain suitable employment. Market frictions imply that
this e¤ort results in employment with probability ls and in unemployment with probability
us = 1  ls. We do not further specify labor market frictions. With independent risks and
large numbers, the ex ante probability ls is equal to the ex post employment rate. The
(un-)employment rate is, thus, exclusively determined by the incentives for job search.
If employed, the worker produces output w per capita equal the gross wage rate. If
unemployed, she derives utility from home production. To avoid complicated interactions
between unemployment insurance and the pension system, we normalize unemployment
benets to zero. This a harmless restriction given our assumption of risk-neutrality.
Wage earnings of an employed worker are subject to the statutory contribution rate t.
By choosing search e¤ort, households determine their individual employment probability
and expected wage income (1  t)wls. The budget identities equal
C1 = (1  t)wl1   A; C2 = x  (1  t)wl2 + (1  x)  P +RA; (2)
where A is (indeterminate) savings and P denotes pension earnings. In the second period,
expected wage earnings accrue only while the agent is active, i.e., during x, and are
replaced by pension income during retirement, (1 x). Similarly, the search e¤ort cost in
(1) is incurred only during the active part of the second period.
A central part of our analysis concerns the relationship determining the size of pension
benets
P = m (x) z + p0: (3)
6However, job search will depend on future pensions if there is a tax benet link.
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Public pensions have three key features: (i) an assessment base z that equals past earnings;
(ii) a conversion factor m (x) that depends on the old-age participation decision x and is
key in determining retirement incentives; and (iii) at, basic pension payments p0 that
are independent of the individuals earnings history. The assessment base is a weighted
average of lifetime earnings
z    w [l1 +  (1  l1)]RP + xw [l2 +  (1  l2)] : (4)
The weight  on rst period earnings allows us to investigate the consequences of
lengthening the calculation period for pension assessment. For example, if  = 0, only the
most recent earnings count in the assessment base. Frequently, pensions are based only on
a limited number of years with the best earnings. Since earnings typically rise with age,
older workers prior to retirement often have the highest earnings. If  = 1, the calculation
period extends over the entire earnings history. In many cases, PAYG systems pay a
notional interest on accumulated earnings points in the assessment base, which introduces
the factor RP in (4). The notional interest rate reects the implicit rate of return of the
PAYG system, which equal to the growth rate of wage earnings, and, thus, falls short of
the market interest factor, i.e. RP < R. If  > 0, periods of unemployment create future
pension claims by crediting a fraction  of the last earnings (prior to unemployment) to
the pension assessment base, a feature instituted by several countries, such as Austria and
Switzerland. On the other hand, if  = 0, households acquire pension entitlements only
when employed and making contributions. An analysis of this rule is important since it
is diametrically opposed to the concept of an unemployment insurance savings account
(UISA) that countries such as Chile have implemented. UISA reduces pension rights
whenever an individual is jobless and claims unemployment benets, and thereby makes
unemployment individually more costly. It is, therefore, often considered an important
policy measure to improve labor market performance.
The conversion factor incorporates important institutional features of PAYG systems.
Depending on its specication, it determines incentives for early or postponed retirement
8
and thereby inuences the old age participation rate. We specify
m (x) = m0 +

1  x: (5)
A Beverage-type system is one in which households receive only at pensions p0, indepen-
dent of earnings, so thatm = 0. A Bismarckian system is one with a xed earnings-benet
link, m = m0 > 0, with p0 = 0 and RP = 1. A Gruber-Wisepension scheme features an
actuarial adjustment of pension earnings that is conditional on the retirement date and
reects the length of the remaining retirement period, m0 (x) > 0, requiring  > 0 in (5).
Postponing retirement (higher participation rate x) thus raises pension benets in (3).
To calculate optimal choices, we substitute the budget identities (2) into preferences
(1), leading to the following two-period problem:
V = maxlt;x (1  t)wl1    (l1) + V2=R; (6)
s:t: : V2 = x  (1  t)wl2 + (1  x)  P   x   (l2)   (x) :
Noting the dependence of pension benets P on the retirement date and previous earnings
as specied in (3)(5), we obtain the following necessary conditions:
(a) :  0 (l1) = (1   1)w;  1  t    (1  ) (1  x)mRP=R;
(b) :  0 (l2) = (1   2)w;  2  t  (1  ) (1  x)m; (7)
(c) : 0 (x) = (1  R)wl2    (l2) ; R  t+ P
wl2
  (1  x)P
0
wl2
;
where postponing retirement raises benets over the remaining retirement period by
P 0  @P=@x = m0z +mw [l2 + (1  l2)] :
We dene e¤ective tax rates  1,  2, and R to summarize the joint impact of social
security on labor market behavior. In the absence of government, these rates would
be zero. Agents then equate the marginal disutility cost with the marginal expected
return along each dimension of labor supply. More search e¤ort boosts the employment
probability ls by 1 at the margin and raises gross expected earnings by w. Job search is
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optimal when the marginal return is equal to marginal e¤ort cost, (1   s)w =  0 (ls).
Postponing retirement by an instant of time raises life-time earnings by wl2 and life-time
utility by wl2   2, after taking into account the e¤ort cost spent on actually obtaining
employment. Continued participation adds an extra utility cost 0, due, for example,
to increasing health problems. Again, the optimal retirement date is found when the
marginal return to continued participation is equal to the marginal disutility of postponed
retirement.
The design of the PAYG system determines the size of e¤ective tax rates. For example,
the e¤ective contribution tax rates (often also called implicittax rates)  1 and  2 are
less than the statutory contribution rate t if pension benets are linked to past earnings
due to the tax benet link. More intensive search leads, then, not only to greater expected
current wage income, but also to greater benets during the retirement period of 1   x.
Consequently, the PAYG contribution rate is not a pure tax since households receive part
of it back as a retirement benet. Moreover, assuming that pension savings earn less
than the market return, RP < R, the e¤ective contribution tax on the young exceeds the
e¤ective tax on older workers,  1 >  2. If the pension calculation period includes only
the most recent earnings prior to retirement ( = 0), higher earnings of young workers
no longer raises future pension benets, which implies that statutory contribution rate
is a full tax, i.e.  1 = t. Extending the calculation period by raising the weight  of
rst period earnings in the assessment base reduces the e¤ective tax rate  1. The system
thereby shifts the e¤ective tax burden from young to old workers. Furthermore, the system
inates the e¤ective contribution tax and undermines incentives for job search if it allows
periods of unemployment to create pension claims by crediting a fraction  of past
earningsw to the assessment base.7 Finally, the participation tax R on continued work
during old age deserves special attention. When retirement is postponed, the individual
continues to pay the statutory contribution rate t, but incurs foregone pension benets as
an opportunity cost that adds the pension replacement rate P= (wl2) to the e¤ective tax
7In reality, this fraction is often equal to the replacement rate for unemployment benets which we
have normalized to zero to reduce complexity.
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rate R. However, the system can substantially reduce the participation tax if it rewards
postponed retirement by a pension supplement P 0  @P=@x > 0 over the remaining
retirement period.
We may further shed light on the labor market incentives of a PAYG pension system by
showing that an ideal capital funded system would be fully neutral and reduce all e¤ective
tax rates to zero. An ideal funded pillar would strictly limit benets to actual mandatory
retirement savings, i.e. to contributions actually paid,  = p0 = 0 and  = 1. It would
pay the market rate of return on accumulated contribution capital, RP = R. It would also
convert contribution capital into benets in an actuarially fair way such that the individual
account is balanced at each date, which implies a conversion factor equal tom = t= (1  x)
with m0 = 0. In this situation e¤ective tax rates on job search are zero,  s = 0. The
funded system would not harm incentives for job search. Evaluating (3)(4), we obtain
P = tz= (1  x) where z = wl1R+xwl2 so that P 0 = [wl2 + z= (1  x)] t= (1  x). Turning
to (7), we nd a zero participation tax, R = 0, which establishes full labor market
neutrality. Another way to see the neutrality of the fully funded system is to evaluate
indirect utility in (6). Since (6) reduces to V = (wl1   1) + (xwl2   x2   ) =R in this
case, all pension parameters drop-out and the funded system does not a¤ect life-time
wealth and utility.
Proposition 1 A pure capital funded system is neutral towards life-cycle unemployment
and retirement behavior.
2.2 General Equilibrium and Welfare
The central feature of a PAYG system is that working generations pay contributions that
are spent on pension income of retired persons. Hence, the system implements an inter-
generational transfer from young to old generations. In our 2-period, three generations
model, the initial old generation 0 is fully retired and collects pensions P o, paid from the
contributions of the young generation 1. Accordingly, we exclude a retirement decision
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of the initial old generation in order to focus on the life-cycle choices of generation 1. In
the same spirit, we add a future(and nal) generation in period 2 that lives only for
one period. We posit that job search of generation 2 is exogenous. Even simpler, and
without loss of generality, we set its employment rate to unity, so that consumption is
Cf =
 
1  tfw. Hence, the future generation contributes a xed transfer tfw to genera-
tion 1 to nance part of its pension income. Given that only a fraction 1 x of generation
1 is retired and collects benets, the periodic PAYG budget restriction would require that
payouts be equal to contributions in each period
P o = twl1; (1  x)P = twxl2 + tfw: (8)
In the following, we wish to analyze intergenerationally neutral reforms that avoid re-
distribution across generations. Hence, welfare of the initial old and the future generation
must be kept constant, requiring P o and tf constant. In this case, any policy change nec-
essarily leads to a periodic decit or surplus. Sustainability of the PAYG system requires
intertemporal budget balance, i.e. contributions and payouts must balance in present
value, or satisfy tw (l1R + xl2) + tfw = RP o + (1  x)P in terms of end of period value
(1  x)P   tfw   twxl2 = RS; S  twl1   P o: (9)
Intertemporal solvency thus requires that the second period decit on the left-hand side
must not exceed todays surplus together with accumulated interest.
In this simple model, and with historically accumulated assets equal to zero, output
in period 1 is Y1 = wl1. It is spent on consumption of the young and old generations
and on savings/investment equal to I = A + S. The GDP identity Y1 = Co + C1 + I is
identically satised when substituting Co = P o and using the budget constraints in (2)
and (9). In period 2, GDP consists of the return on invested capital and on output of
the still active workers of generation 1 and the future generation, Y2 = IR + w (xl2 + 1).
Using Cf =
 
1  tfw and substituting the budgets in (2) and (9), we again obtain the
GDP identity of period 2, Y2 = C2 + Cf .
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We wish to evaluate pension reform by calculating welfare changes. Recall that the
old generation in period 1 simply consumes PAYG pensions and, thus, enjoys welfare
V o = Co=R = P o=R. The welfare of the current generation corresponds to (6). In turn,
the future generation in period 2 consumes after-tax wage earnings and dies thereafter,
leading to welfare V f = Cf =
 
1  tfw. We adopt the Calvo and Obstfeld (1988)
approach and dene social welfare as 
 = V oR+ V + V f=R which is implicitly restricted
by the intertemporal budget constraint in (9). Substituting all welfare terms and imposing
(9) yields the following welfare criterion:

 = wl1    (l1) + [w (xl2 + 1)  x (l2)   (x)] =R: (10)
3 Comparative Statics and Welfare
We explore the labor market consequences of pension reform by considering policy ex-
periments involving changes in the parameters that dene the pension assessment base,
determine retirement incentives and change the composition between earnings linked and
at pensions. Given that e¤ective tax rates and life-cycle search are functions of the retire-
ment date and the contribution rate, we treat x and t as the two equilibrating variables.
The comparative static analysis derives changes in variables relative to initial equilibrium
values. As discussed below, we assume that the initial equilibrium is characterized by
RP =  = 1 and  = 0.
3.1 Retirement Choice
Throughout the rest of the paper, we work in terms relative changes, i.e., x^  dx=x for
variables and ^  d= (1  ) for implicit tax rates. We rst show how the retirement
date and the statutory contribution rate a¤ect the earnings-benet link and the e¤ective
tax rates on job search. A shift in pension policy, together with changes in the two
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endogenous variables, a¤ects the conversion factor in (5) according to
dm = m0x  x^+ d m; d m  dm0 + d
1  x: (11)
When the government grants higher pensions, it raises the conversion factor, d m > 0. To
provide incentives for postponed retirement, it sets  > 0 to make benets sensitive to
the chosen retirement date. The conversion factor then rises automatically when people
postpone retirement. For later use, note that (1  x)m0 = m m0.
The e¤ective tax rates on job search, dened in (7), after substituting for (11), change
by
^ 1 =
1
1   1

m0x
R
 x^+ dt+ 1  x
R
[m  (d  d)  d m]

; (12)
^ 2 =
1
1   2 fm0x  x^+ dt+ (1  x) [m  d  d m]g :
A higher statutory contribution rate t naturally raises e¤ective tax rates. Less obviously,
e¤ective taxes also rise if workers choose a longer a working life, i.e., x^ > 0. This is
because workers must not only wait longer until more earnings today are rewarded with
higher pension benets under an operative tax benet link, but also because the benet
is available for a shorter remaining retirement period. Crediting imputed earnings during
periods of unemployment, d > 0, raises the e¤ective tax rate and discourages search. In
contrast, strengthening the tax-benet link, as parameterized by d m, reduces e¤ective tax
rates and stimulates job search. We will use the parameter  to capture the implications of
lengthening the earnings calculation period. We note that a greater weight of rst period
earnings reduces the e¤ective tax rate on young workers. The logarithmic derivatives of
the optimality conditions in (7a)(7b) reveal how employment rates respond to shifts in
the implicit tax rates
l^1 =  1  ^ 1; l^2 =  2  ^ 2; (13)
where the elasticities are dened as s   0s= (ls 00s). Changes in employment and unem-
ployment rates are unemployment negatively related, u^t =  l^s  ls= (1  ls).
14
The individual retirement choice determines the participation rate in the cross-section
of the older population. Using  0 (l2) = (1   2)wl2 from (7b) gives
0  x^ =  wl2  dt  (t   2)wl2  l^2   d [P   (1  x)P 0] ;   x00=0: (14)
To obtain response of participation in terms of policy variables, we must derive the term
d [P   (1  x)P 0]. After some tedious (though straightforward) algebra in appendix A,
the retirement condition emerges as8
rX  x^ =  rT  dt+ (1  x)rM  d m  z  dm0   dp0 +r  d r  d; (15)
where, in general, we dene all r-coe¢ cients to be positive:
rX  0 + (wl2 +rM)m0x; rM  wl2  m0	1  m0	2 > 0;
rT  wl2  m0R	1  m0	2 > 0; 	1  1wl1(1 1)R ; 	2  2wxl21 2 ;
r  (w  rM) (1  x)m m0Z; r  m0 [wl1 + (1  x)m	1] ;
Z  w (1  l1) + wx (1  l2) :
The reduced-form coe¢ cients 	1 and 	2 in (15) reect the inuence of job search on
the participation decision. Although the statutory tax rate t is an endogenous variable,
it is illustrative to consider the implications of a rise in t on the retirement decision x^.
The direct e¤ect is, of course, a decline in after-tax earnings. This leads people to retire
earlier, since collecting a pension is marginally more attractive compared to working.
On the other hand, this e¤ect is o¤set by the fact that a higher tax rate erodes the
incentives for job search which lowers earnings and thereby reduces pensions by a factor
of m0 per wage unit. This, in turn, raises the gains to old-age participation and leads
agents to retire later. If the direct e¤ect dominates, then a higher contribution rate results
in early retirement, i.e. rT > 0, which implies a negative relationship between the two
endogenous variables in (15). Note thatrT > 0 necessarily impliesrM > 0. We postpone
the discussion of the impact of other policy parameters on retirement to section 4 where
we investigate several alternative policy reforms.
8To solve for (15), we must also substitute for the responses of employment, l^s, both directly and
through the term d [P   (1  x)P 0]. For further details see appendix A.
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3.2 Intertemporal Solvency
The second equilibrium condition is the intertemporal budget constraint in (9). To exclude
intergenerational redistribution, we hold P o and tf xed and obtain the di¤erential
(l1R + xl2)w  dt =  

t+
P
wl2

wxl2  x^  twl1R  l^1   twxl2  l^2 + (1  x)  dP; (16)
where the coe¢ cient wl1R+wxl2 on dt represents a persons life-time contribution base,
expressed in period 2 values. Sustainability requires a higher contribution rate if employ-
ment in periods 1 and 2 declines, if households retire earlier, and if pension benets to the
retired fraction 1 x of the old generation become more generous. To derive the reduced-
form response of the contribution rate, we substitute for the employment response l^s as
stated in (13) and the benet changes dP induced by the pension rule in (3). Detailed
derivations in appendix B show that the solvency condition requires an adjustment of the
contribution rate equals
BT  dt =  BX  x^+ (1  x) (dp0 +BM  d m) + (1  x)m (B  d+B  d) ; (17)
where coe¢ cients are dened as follows (note BT > BM):
BT 

1   11
1   1

wl1R +

1   22
1   2

wxl2;
BX  Rwxl2   wl1  11
1   1m0x  wxl2
 22
1   2m0x;
BM 

1   11
1   1

wl1 +

1   22
1   2

wxl2;
B  Z + wl1  11
1   1 + wxl2
 22
1   2 ; B 

1   11
1   1

wl1:
Like the retirement condition, the PAYG solvency condition implies a negative relationship
between retirement and contribution rates: extending working life boosts revenues which
supports solvency with a lower contribution rate.
3.3 Equilibrium and Welfare
The retirement and solvency conditions (15) and (17) form a simultaneous system in x^
and dt where the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix is  . Inverting the matrix system
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yields the equilibrium solution24 x^
dt
35 = 1
 
24 BT  rT
 BX rX
3524 EX
ET
35 ;    rXBT  rTBX ; (18)
where the changes in pension policy are collected in the following terms:
EX = (1  x)rM  d m  dp0   z  dm0 +r  d r  d;
ET = (1  x) (dp0 +BM  d m) + (1  x)m (B  d+B  d) :
Figure 1 below illustrates the stable solution, where the retirement locus R and the
governments solvency locus G are negatively sloped, i.e., dt=x^jR =  rX=rT < 0 and
dt=x^jG =  BX=BT < 0. Moreover, stability requires that the retirement locus is steeper
than the solvency locus
rX=rT > BX=BT ,   > 0:
To conduct welfare analysis, we compute the di¤erential of (10). To avoid intergener-
ational redistribution and isolate the e¢ ciency e¤ects of policy changes, we hold constant
the tax tfw paid by the future generation and the pension benet P o received by the
initial old generation so that their welfare levels, V o and V f , are not a¤ected. Calculating
the di¤erential of (10) and substituting the optimality conditions (7) yields
d
 =  1wl1  l^1 +  2wxl2
R
 l^2 + Rwxl2
R
 x^: (19)
Welfare changes are proportional to e¤ective tax rates  1,  2, and R that measure the
distortions to life-cycle labor supply. The greater is the initial distortion, the larger is the
welfare loss from further discouraging labor supply on that margin.
4 Pension Reform
In studying labor market and welfare consequences of pension reform, we consider four
widely discussed policies: (i) greater actuarial fairness, (ii) strengthening the tax benet
link, (iii) reforming the assessment base, and (iv) and extending the calculation period.
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4.1 Greater Actuarial Fairness
A policy of greater actuarial fairness is one that rewards households for postponed re-
tirement or, conversely, penalizes them for leaving the workforce early, in a way that
is more consistent with intertemporal balance of life-time benets and contributions.9
Specically, this requires making the pension conversion factor more sensitive to a vari-
ation of the retirement date x by raising the parameter . To prevent the system from
becoming more generous, the at component m0 must be simultaneously reduced to keep
the level of the conversion factor constant. By (11), the restriction d m = 0 requires
dm0 =  d= (1  x) < 0. Setting all other changes of policy parameters in (18) to zero
yields the equilibrium impact on retirement behavior and the required contribution rate
x^ =  zBT
 
 dm0 > 0; dt = zBX
 
 dm0 < 0: (20)
The e¤ect of greater actuarial fairness is to strengthen incentives for later retirement.
In Figure 1, the retirement locus dened in (15) shifts to the right, while the solvency
condition in (17) is not directly a¤ected. More actuarial fairness boosts the retirement age
and allows for a smaller contribution rate. Analytically, this is the case if the coe¢ cients
BT andBX are positive. The coe¢ cientBT measures the net e¤ect of a higher contribution
rate on the budget. A higher rate directly boosts revenue, but also discourages job search,
which erodes the tax base. The net e¤ect in each period is positive if  ss= (1   s) < 1,
s = 1; 2, implying BT > 0. The coe¢ cient BX measures the net e¤ect of an increase
in the retirement age on the life-time contribution base and on tax revenue. Again, the
direct e¤ect of a higher x raises revenue in proportion to the e¤ective tax rate R. When
the conversion factor is not actuarially fair and contains a xed component m0, later
retirement, according to (12), also raises e¤ective tax rates on prime age workers and
discourages job search. Higher unemployment shrinks the contribution base and erodes
revenue. The net e¤ect is positive as long as  ss= (1   s) is small and the e¤ective tax
rate R is relatively large, i.e., as long as BX > 0.
9Recall the discussion on actuarial fairness at the end of section 2.1.
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Please see Figure 1 at the end of the paper
To determine the consequences for job search and welfare, we must calculate the change
in e¤ective tax rates  1 and  2 and the labor market response of prime age workers.
Substituting (20) into (12), ^ 1 = [(m0x=R)  x^+ dt] = (1   1), yields
^ 1 =
BX  BT m0x=R
(1   1)   z  dm0; ^ 2 =
BX  BT m0x
(1   2)   z  dm0: (21)
Clearly, the changes in old age participation and the contribution rate in the numerator
have opposite e¤ects on ^ 1. Postponing retirement raises the e¤ective period 1 taxby
lengthening the time households have to wait for their pensionwhile a lower contribution
rate reduces it. We can show that the inuence of the contribution rate dominates that
of the participation decision, as long as the search response in period 2 is not too strong.
This implies that ^ 1 < 0. Consequently, job search in period 1 intensies which boosts
employment, l^1 =  1^ 1 > 0 and cuts the unemployment rate, u^1 < 0.10
Unlike the change in the e¤ective rst period tax, the sign of ^ 2 can be positive or
negative (^ 2 ? 0), leading to an ambiguous response of search and unemployment among
older workers. This ambiguity is, in fact, intuitive. The cost of deferring retirement
benets can outweigh the benets of facing a lower PAYG contribution rate. While
younger households discount the cost of delayed retirement by R, the cost for their older
counterparts is imminent and can discourage search in period 2. Raising the retirement
age thus might benet or hurt older workers but unambiguously stimulates employment
among younger workers. Hence, increased old age participation on account of a higher
retirement age does not crowd-out young workers in our framework.
We can show that moving towards greater actuarial fairness reduces labor market dis-
tortions and boosts welfare, which depends in (19) on the agents labor market responses
over the life cycle. Even though the employment risk of older workers might rise if ^ 2 > 0
and possibly lead to a welfare loss, we can calculate, by substituting l^s =  s^ s into (19)
10Using R  t + m0z+p0 (1 x)mwl2wl2 eventually leads to BX   BT  m0x=R = 2wxl2 + xp0 +
1  221 2

wxl2
R 1
R m0x > 0. A su¢ cient condition to guarantee ^1 < 0 is 1  221 2 > 0.
19
and using (20)(21) and the denition of BX , an overall welfare gain equal to
d
 =
BX
R
 x^ 

 11
1   1wl1 +
 22
(1   2)Rwxl2

 dt > 0: (22)
Moving towards greater actuarial fairness in retirement incentives unambiguously boosts
welfare since it mitigates the net distortions on life-cycle labor market behavior.
Proposition 2 Introducing pension supplements and discounts for more actuarial fair-
ness in pension assessment encourages postponed retirement, boosts job search and em-
ployment of younger workers, and raises welfare.
4.2 Strengthening the Tax Benet Link
We next consider an alternative policy reform: strengthening the tax benet link by a
harmonization of the system. In reality, substantial parts of the population such as civil
servants or farmers often are subject to separate rules that feature an incomplete tax ben-
et link. Arguably even more important is the fact that many countries feature minimum
pensions that are not linked to past earnings. Some countries such as Switzerland also
have maximum pensions so that contributions on earnings above a given upper income
ceiling do not lead to higher pensions. In all these cases the tax benet link is not oper-
ative, implying that contributions become a full labor tax. In our model, we capture the
presence of at pensions by the assessment rule P = m0z+ p0. Harmonization subjects a
larger population share to the common earnings linked system in which at pensions p0
are replaced by earnings linked benets m0z such that the overall pension level remains
constant for given behavior. To concentrate on the role of the tax benet link, we set
 = 0 in (5) so that the conversion factor is not sensitive to the retirement choice x. The
scenario thus raises the conversion factor for a higher earnings linked pension and cuts the
at benet by dp0 =  zdm0 =  zd m to keep the overall benet level xed. Evaluating
(18) yields an equilibrium change in the retirement date and the required contribution
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rate equal to11
x^ =
1  x
 
[rMBT + (z  BM)rT ]  dm0 > 0; (23)
dt =  1  x
 
[rMBX + (z  BM)rX ]  dm0 < 0:
As in the case of more actuarial fairness, harmonization results in more old-age par-
ticipation that funds through a longer working life and higher contributions a lower
PAYG contribution rate. The responses of x^ and dt follow from the fact that all co-
e¢ cients in the square brackets including the term z   BM are positive. Replacing a
at by an earnings linked benet rewards continued work to a greater extent since the
conversion factor m0 rewards an increase in the assessment base due to postponed retire-
ment with a higher pension over the remaining life-time, which is not the case with a at
benet. Equation (15) shows that harmonization shifts the retirement locus R in Figure
1 (not drawn) to the right. According to (17), this reform also shifts down the scal
locus G, since a stronger tax benet link reduces the tax character of contributions and,
thereby, encourages job search and the augmentation of the contribution base. Indeed,
the higher are the search elasticities s, the stronger is the growth in the assessment base
and the more the solvency constraint can be relaxed to accommodate a lower value of the
contribution rate dt,which reinforces incentives to postpone retirement.
Turning to e¤ective tax rates on job search, we can calculate from (12) that strength-
ening the tax benet link directly reduces e¤ective tax rates and stimulates employment
in both life-cycle periods
^ 1 =
1
1   1

m0x
R
 x^+ dt  1  x
R
 dm0

< 0; (24)
^ 2 =
1
1   2 [m0x  x^+ dt  (1  x)  dm0] < 0:
To see this most easily, consider an introduction of a small earnings linked pension in
the absence of any (initial) tax benet link (m = m0 = 0) so that all pensions are at.
Contributions are then a full tax,  1 =  2 = t and R = t + p0= (wl2). In this case, the
11Using BM and z and evaluating at  = 0 and  = 1 gives z  BM = 111 1wl1 + 221 2wxl2 > 0.
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inuence of the retirement age x on e¤ective tax rates disappears. Since the policy allows
for a reduction of the contribution rate, dt < 0, the introduction of a small tax benet
link clearly reduces e¤ective tax rates on job search, and more so for older workers,
^ 2 < ^ 1 < 0. Strengthening the tax benet link thus boosts job search and reduces
unemployment of both old and young workers. If the conversion factor is increased from
an already positive level, the induced increase in the retirement age x starts to raise
e¤ective tax rates on job search and o¤sets the policys stimulating e¤ect on employment.
Although the computations are complicated, we nevertheless obtain reduced-form versions
of (24), after substitution of (23), establishing that harmonization reduces both ^ 1 and
^ 2.12 In sum, harmonization stimulates all three margins of life-cycle employment and
clearly improves e¢ ciency, as is evident from (19), d
 =  1wl1l^1+ 2wxl2R l^2+Rwxl2R x^ > 0.
Proposition 3 Harmonization of the system and, hence, strengthening the tax benet
link boosts all margins of life-cycle employment and raises welfare.
4.3 Reforming the Assessment Base
Some countries, such as Austria and Switzerland, add a fraction of last earnings prior to
unemployment towards the pension assessment base z so that periods of unemployment
also create pension entitlements. To capture the consequences of this policy, we marginally
raise the weight  of unemployment in (4), starting from a value of zero. For a given
conversion factor, the larger assessment base, dz = Zd, translates into a higher pension,
dP = mZd, where Z  w(1   l1) + wx(1   l2) if  = 1 initially. Presumably, the
motivation is to provide better protection against old age poverty.13 For this reason, we do
not impose another compensating policy and allow the pension size to increase. The policy
is costly and must be nanced with higher contributions. As a further simplication, we
set m0 = 0 so that the conversion factor is fully sensitive to a variation in the retirement
12A separate appendix with a detailed proof is available on request.
13We address here only the policys implications for economic e¢ ciency. The present framework does
not allow us to discuss intragenerational redistribution.
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date. Given that  is the only policy parameter to change, the shift terms in (18) are
EX = rd > 0 and ET = (1  x)mBd > 0. Evaluating the solution (18) then yields
x^ =
w (1  l2) BT   wl2 B
 
(1  x)m  d; (25)
dt =
0 B   Rwxl2  w (1  l2)
 
(1  x)m  d;
where B and BT are both positive. If the old age unemployment rate is small, i.e.,
if (1   l2) ! 0, the policy inates the contribution rate and leads to early retirement,
dt > 0 > x^. The incentive to early retirement is driven both by the increase in pensions
and the heavier taxation of active wage earnings. Both adjustments make continued
participation in the labor market less attractive to workers near retirement.
Crediting unemployment spells towards the pension assessment base makes the con-
sequences of unemployment less dramatic since the loss in old age retirement income as a
result of unemployment is reduced. The policy thus discourages job search. The assump-
tion of m0 = 0 eliminates the inuence of a change in the retirement age on the e¤ective
tax rate in (12). Noting dt > 0, we nd that the policy unambiguously raises e¤ective
tax rates on search
^ 1 =
dt+ (1  x)m=R  d
1   1 > 0; ^ 2 =
dt+ (1  x)m  d
1   2 > 0: (26)
Consequently, employment rates fall by l^s =  s^ s, leading to larger unemployment
among young and old workers. Combining this with the shift towards early retirement,
x^ < 0, welfare declines along all margins of life-cycle labor supply
d
 =  1wl1  l^1 +  2wxl2
R
 l^2 + Rwxl2
R
 x^ < 0: (27)
Proposition 4 In an earnings linked system, crediting periods of unemployment towards
the pension assessment base boosts unemployment and encourages early retirement. Wel-
fare declines on all margins of labor supply.
Crediting unemployment periods towards pension assessment is likely intended to pre-
vent old age poverty. However, this policy goal may be achieved using minimum pensions
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p0 as an instrument. It is interesting to observe that the crediting of unemployment spells
is just the opposite of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA). The balance of
these accounts is reduced each time when individuals draw unemployment benets. At
the date of retirement, a smaller balance means a smaller pension.
4.4 Extending the Calculation Period
Until recently, many countries have assessed pensions on the basis of the best years of
earnings, rather than extending the calculation period over the entire working life. Typi-
cally, life-cycle earnings proles tend to be rising and weakly hump-shaped, implying that
the best years of earnings accrue late in the career. Extending the calculation period
means including earlier life-cycle periods. In our framework, the parameter  would be
low initially, or even zero, to reect the fact that the rst parts of earnings are only in-
completely included in the assessment base since they typically do not belong to the best
earning years. Extending the calculation period over the entire earnings history implies
raising the weight  in (4) towards one,  ! 1. Obviously, with more years included, the
assessment base is augmented so that pensions get larger. To prevent this, the conversion
factor must be simultaneously scaled down.
To keep our calculations simple, we mimic the policy measure by considering the
reverse experiment. We start from  = 1 initially and reduce it. We compensate the
reduction in the assessment base by raising the conversion factor m0 such that the policy
shift keeps pension size xed for given, constant behavior. We can considerably simplify
computations by starting from a situation in which m0 = 0, so that the conversion fac-
tor m (x) is fully sensitive to retirement choice prior to the policy change. Given these
assumptions, the experiment is d < 0 < dm0 = d m. Without any behavioral response,
the assessment base z = wl1 + wxl2 shrinks by dz = wl1d. To keep pension benets
P = mz + p0 constant, we raise, in turn, the conversion factor by
z  dm0 =  mwl1  d; d m = dm0: (28)
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The scenario thus shifts the system in (18) by EX = [(1  x)rM   z] dm0   rd and
ET = (1  x)BMdm0 + (1  x)mBd.14 Inserting the resulting r- and B-coe¢ cients
from (15) and (17) and noting the policy restriction above, we obtain
EX =   [z   (1  x)wl2]  dm0; ET =

 11
1   1  
 22
1   2

(1  x)wxl2  dm0: (29)
Lacking evidence to the contrary, we assume less elastic search on the part of older workers,
1 > 2. Since  1 >  2 > 0, we nd ET > 0 and EX < 0.15 In Figure 1, these changes
would shift up the budget locus and move the retirement locus to the left, leading to
earlier retirement and a higher contribution rate in the new equilibrium. Analytically, we
derive from (18)
x^ =  
[z   (1  x)wl2] BT +

11
1 1   221 2

wxl2  (1  x)wl2
 
 dm0 < 0; (30)
dt =
0

11
1 1   221 2

wxl2  (1  x)wl2 + [z   (1  x)wl2]  Rwxl2
 
 dm0 > 0;
where BT > 0. Intuitively, a shorter calculation period (recall that we consider the reverse
experiment d < 0) shrinks the assessment base and calls for higher contributions when
pension size is kept constant by a compensating increase in the conversion factor. This
leaves lower net of tax earnings, compared with a constant pension, and thus induces
people to retire earlier since continued work becomes less attractive relative to receiving
benets. As the graphical argument illustrates, these immediate adjustments reinforce
each other and magnify the equilibrium responses. Clearly, the policy inates the con-
tribution tax and leads to early retirement. In retiring earlier, people willingly accept a
decline in the conversion factor and of pension benets in equilibrium.
To obtain the consequences for life-cycle unemployment, we evaluate the e¤ective tax
rates on job search in (12). Starting from a situation of m0 = 0 eliminates the e¤ect of
a marginal change in the retirement age x and leaves d 1 = dt   1 xR [md + dm0] and
14With m0 = 0, we have r = 0, rM = wl2, rX = 0, rT = wl2 and BX  Rwxl2.
15If life-cycle search is comparable between younger and older workers, i.e. l1  l2, then z (1  x)wl2 =
w (l1   l2) + 2wxl2 > 0.
25
d 2 = dt  (1  x) dm0. For young workers, the e¤ective tax rate rises by
^ 1 =
1
1   1

dt+
1  x
wl1R
wxl2  dm0

> 0: (31)
Clearly, the higher distortion causes more unemployment among young workers.
The e¤ective tax on older workers, in contrast, changes ambiguously. The exogenous
increase in the conversion factor reduces the e¤ective tax rate since any marginal increase
in earnings is rewarded with a larger pension increment. The higher contribution rate, in
contrast, raises the e¤ective tax. Hence, without further restrictions, the change in  2 is
ambiguous. Substituting for the solution (30), using  , and evaluating (12) for this policy
yields
^ 2 =

11
1 1   221 2

wxl2 (1  x)wl2 + Rwxl2  z   (1  x)0BT
(1   2)    dm0 ? 0: (32)
If the retirement elasticity is small enough,  ! 0, the e¤ective tax rises, ^ 2 > 0. On
the other hand, if  is large, and R =  2 = 0 (in the case of p0 = m0 = 0), then the
e¤ective tax rate on period 2 search could even fall, ^ 2 < 0. In general, then, this policy
change has an ambiguous impact on job search and unemployment among older workers.
In any case, however, we expect the absolute magnitude of the change to be small.
Knowing behavioral responses, we can evaluate the welfare e¤ects in (19). Our reverse
experiment of shortening the calculation period, requiring a higher conversion factor for
compensation, raises the distortions in retirement choice and young workersjob search.
Welfare falls on both accounts. Given the ambiguous impact on the employment of older,
still active workers, these losses may be reinforced or partly o¤set. Several cases lead us
to believe that the net welfare e¤ect remains negative, even if the e¤ective tax on old
workers declines. For example, if p0 = m0 = 0, then R =  2 = 0, as mentioned above,
results in d
 =  1wl1  l^1 < 0. Furthermore, even if R and  2 are positive, a possible
increase in ^ 2 would lead to a weak reduction of the employment rate of old workers if
job search is very inelastic. With 2 ! 0, d
   1wl1  l^1 + Rwxl2R  x^ < 0. All things
considered, our intuition is that this policy experiment likely reduces welfare.
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Since this analysis relates to the reverse experiment, a lengthening of the calculation
period yields the following e¤ects:
Proposition 5 Lengthening the pension calculation period together with a compensating
reduction in the conversion factor encourages postponed retirement and strengthens job
search and employment of young workers. Employment of older, still active workers may
rise or fall. Overall welfare is likely to increase, subject to an ambiguous, and probably
small welfare component, due an ambiguous change in the old age employment rate.
5 Conclusion
It is well-known that a PAYG pension system can distort the labor market outcomes on
both intensive and extensive margins of work. The goal of this paper is to develop a
life-cycle framework of labor market search and retirement to study how pension reform
a¤ects labor market performance and social welfare. Within our simple OLG setting, we
consider the following parametric policies: i) increasing actuarial fairness of the pension
system towards retirement behavior; ii) strengthening the tax benet link by a harmo-
nization of the system; iii) reforming the pension assessment base by excluding periods of
unemployment; and iv) an extension of the calculation period. Among these options, we
nd that harmonization boosts work incentives on all margins of life-cycle labor supply
and unambiguously raises welfare. More actuarial fairness in making pensions condi-
tional on retirement choice not only encourages postponed retirement but also stimulates
employment among young workers. However, there is an ambiguous e¤ect on search in-
centives and employment of older workers. Despite of this ambiguity, the net welfare
gain is positive. A reform that eliminates periods of unemployment from the pension
assessment base strengthens search incentives, boosts employment over the entire life-
cycle, encourages late retirement, and promises unambiguous e¢ ciency gains. Extending
the calculation period for pension assessment similarly favors young workers and encour-
ages postponed retirement while employment rates of older workers close to retirement
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respond ambiguously. Welfare rises if job search among old workers is inelastic or if it is
not distorted in the rst place.
Appendix A: Retirement Condition
Appendix A solves for the retirement condition (15). We start by calculating the term
d [P   (1  x)P 0] = dP + P 0x  x^   (1  x) dP 0 given in (14). Considering the rst com-
ponent, we use (11) and get
dP = z (m0x  x^+ d m) +m  dz + dp0: (A.1)
Given P 0 = m0z +mw [l2 + (1  l2)] in (7), evaluated at  = 0, we calculate
dP 0 = z  dm0 +m0  dz + wl2  dm+mwl2  l^2 +mw(1  l2)  d;
dP 0 =

z
2m0
1  x + wl2m
0

x  x^+ z
(1  x)2  d+ wl2  d m (A.2)
: +m0  dz +mwl2  l^2 +mw(1  l2)  d;
where we use dm = m0xx^+d m and dm0 = 2m0xx^=(1 x)+d= (1  x)2 to get the second
equality. We substitute (A.1)(A.2) into d [P   (1  x)P 0] = dP + xP 0  x^  (1  x)  dP 0
and use the denition of P 0 as well as m  (1  x)m0 = m0 to obtain
: d [P   (1  x)P 0] = xwl2m0  x^+m0  dz   (1  x)mwl2  l^2 + dp0 (A.3)
:   z
1  x  d+ [z   (1  x)wl2]  d m  (1  x)mw(1  l2)  d:
As a last step, we need to substitute for dz. Evaluating the derivative of z in (4) where
 = 1 and  = 0, and using the denition Z  w (1  l1) + xw (1  l2) yields
dz = wxl2  x^+ wl1 

d + l^1

+ wxl2  l^2 + Z  d: (A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.3) leads to
: d [P   (1  x)P 0] = 2m0wxl2  x^+m0wl1 

d + l^1

: + [m0x  (1  x)m]wl2  l^2 + dp0 (A.5)
: +z  dm0   (1  x)wl2  d m+ [m0Z   (1  x)mw (1  l2)]  d;
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where we use [z   (1  x)wl2]  d m   z1 x  d = z  dm0   (1  x)wl2  d m. Combining
(A.5) with (14) yields
(0 + 2m0wxl2)  x^ =  m0wl1  l^1  m0wxl2  l^2   wl2  dt
:  m0wl1  d   [m0Z   (1  x)mw (1  l2)]  d (A.6)
: + (1  x)wl2  d m  z  dm0   dp0;
where we employ the relationship (t   2) = (1  x)m. The nal step to derive the
retirement locus (15) is to substitute the employment responses l^s =  s^ s together with
(12) into (A.6). This yields:
: [0 + (2wl2  m0	1  m0	2)m0x]  x^ =   (wl2  Rm0	1  m0	2)  dt
:  dp0   z  dm0 + (wl2  m0	1  m0	2) (1  x)  d m (A.7)
: + f[w (1  l2) +m0	1 +m0	2] (1  x)m m0Zg  d
:  m0 [wl1 + (1  x)m	1]  d;
where 	1  1wl1(1 1)R and 	2  2wxl21 2 . This equation is the retirement condition (15)
stated in the main text after substituting for the r-coe¢ cients.
Appendix B: Fiscal Balance
To obtain the reduced form PAYG budget constraint, we substitute out the change in
pensions and employment in (16). The change in benets follows upon substituting (A.4)
into (A.1) and noting P 0 = wl2m+ zm0 in the coe¢ cient of x^
dP = xP 0  x^+ z  d m+ dp0 +mZ  d+mwl1 

d + l^1

+mwxl2  l^2: (B.1)
Substituting (B.1) into (16), and recalling the denitions of the e¤ective tax rates in (7),
evaluated at  = 0 and RP =  = 1, yields
(wl1R + wxl2)  dt =  Rwxl2  x^   1wl1R  l^1    2wxl2  l^2 (B.2)
: + (1  x) z  d m+ (1  x) [dp0 +mZ  d+mwl1  d] :
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When participation of the old and search induced employment of active workers change,
the contribution rate must adjust in proportion to the e¤ective tax rates on these margins,
R,  1, and  2, where wl1R + wxl2 represents the life-time contribution base.
The nal step to obtain the reduced form change in the contribution rate necessary
to sustain intertemporal solvency is to substitute the employment responses l^s =  s^ s
together with (12) into (B.2). After collecting terms, we obtain:
:

1   11
1   1

wl1R +

1   22
1   2

wxl2

 dt
=  

Rwl2  

 11
1   1wl1 +
 22
1   2wxl2

m0

x  x^+ (1  x) dp0 (B.3)
: +

1   11
1   1

wl1 +

1   22
1   2

wxl2

(1  x)  d m
: +

Z +
 11
1   1wl1 +
 22
1   2wxl2

(1  x)m  d
: +

1   11
1   1

wl1 (1  x)m  d:
This equation is identical to (17) after substituting for the B-coe¢ cients dened in the
main text.
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